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A CONTRADICTION IN INTERPRETATIONS: A LOOK AT
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING CREDITOR
DERIVATIVE STANDING IN BANKRUPTCY
Lisa J. Pappas'
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past few years the issue of a plaintiff's standing to com-
mence adversary litigation in bankruptcy has grown exponentially. Particu-
larly, the issue concerning whether or not creditors' committees can initiate
suit on behalf of the bankruptcy estate to avoid fraudulent transfers by the
debtor in possession has received increased attention. Although there is no
express provision in the Bankruptcy Code granting creditors' committees
the right to commence adversary proceedings, some courts have found an
implied right to bring suit on behalf of the estate. However, not all courts
are in agreement on the issue of creditor derivative standing. Some circuits
allow creditors to bring suit derivatively, some allow derivative suits in lim-
ited situations, and other courts deny creditors' committees the right bring
derivative suits altogether. This Comment will explore the doctrine of the
split among the circuits by analyzing the policies for and against creditor
derivative standing in bankruptcy. Furthermore, this Comment will ex-
plore two significant cases that have added more fuel to the fire2 of the split
among the circuits.3
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Split Amongst the Circuits
While some circuits have allowed creditors to bring derivative suits on
behalf of the bankruptcy estate, these circuits recognize that such a right is
the exception and not the rule.4 The Bankruptcy Code does not provide
explicit authority for creditors to initiate adversary proceedings, but most
bankruptcy courts that have considered the issue "have found an implied,
1. Lisa Pappas graduated summa cum laude from Mississippi State University with a BBA
(Bachelor's of Business Administration) in finance in May 2005. She graduated magna cum laude from
Mississippi College School of Law May 2009. During the academic year in 2008, Lisa was a visiting
student at the University of Georgia. Currently, Lisa is working for the Prosecuting Attorney's Counsel
of Georgia as an Investigator, where she will concentrate her efforts on the back log of Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) cases and prepare these cases for trial. She would like to give a special
thanks to Professor Cecile Edwards, without her advice, support and encouragement this comment
would not have been possible. She would also like to thank her husband, her parents, and the rest of
the family for being so supportive and understanding during her law school career.
2. Emphasis added.
3. This Comment will look at the Supreme Court decision in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (1942) as well as the Third Circuit case of Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics ex rel. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 552 (3d Cir. 2003).
4. See, e.g., In re SPM Mfg. Corp. v. Stern, 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).
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but qualified, right for creditors to initiate adversary proceedings in the
name of the debtor-in-possession under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(5) and
1109(b)."s Derivative standing is thus an implied exception to the general
rule that the trustee or the debtor in possession has the right and the power
to bring suit on behalf of the estate and in fact has the legal responsibility
to do so. 6
Most of the circuits that have allowed a creditors' committee to bring a
derivative suit on behalf of the estate have placed limitations on such a
right. The Second Circuit noted that although there was no explicit author-
ity for creditors' committees to initiate suits, courts that have considered
the issue have allowed a creditors' committee to bring suit on behalf of the
estate "only when the trustee or debtor in possession unjustifiably failed to
bring suit or abused its discretion in not suing to avoid a preferential trans-
fer."' The Second Circuit agreed with the other bankruptcy courts and
held that 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(5) and 1109(b) "imply a qualified right for
creditors' committees to initiate suit with the approval of the bankruptcy
court."' Other circuits have followed suit and allowed creditors' commit-
tees to bring an action only when a debtor in possession has refused to do
so. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that derivative standing would be
available only where "the debtor was shirking his statutory responsibili-
ties."' Furthermore the Seventh Circuit has held that if a "trustee unjustifi-
ably refuses a demand to bring an action to enforce a colorable claim of a
creditor, the creditor may obtain permission of the bankruptcy court to
bring the action in place of, and in the name of, the trustee."10
Other circuits that allow creditor derivative standing have placed even
stricter requirements on a creditor's ability to gain standing. The Sixth Cir-
cuit, in 1995, held that:
[A] creditor or creditors' committee may have derivative
standing to initiate an avoidance action where: 1) a demand
has been made upon the statutorily authorized party to take
action; 2) the demand is declined; 3) a colorable claim that
would benefit the estate if successful exists, based on a cost
-benefit analysis performed by the court; and 4) the inac-
tion is an abuse of discretion ("unjustified") in light of the
debtor-in-possession's duties in a Chapter 11 case."
5. In re STN Enters. Inc., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985).
6. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 323 (1978).
7. In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d. at 904. The Second Circuit quoted In re STN Enters, where it
noted that it has previously held that derivative standing 'to initiate a suit with the approval of the
bankruptcy courts" exists when the "debtor in possession [has] unjustifiably failed to bring suit."' In re
Smart World Techs., LLC., 423 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d. at
904).
8. Id.
9. In re Xonics Photochemical Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 203 (7th Cir. 1988).
10. Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000).
11. In re The Gibson Group, Inc., 66 F.3d 1436, 1446 (6th Cir. 1995).
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Furthermore, the court concluded that a creditor has met its burden if
it has satisfied the first three prongs and the debtor-in-possession has failed
to take action without stating a reason.1 2 Then, the burden will shift to the
"debtor-in-possession to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that its reason for not acting is justified.""
Some courts have granted creditors' committees derivative standing
under the auspices of the equitable power of bankruptcy courts. Recently,
in a 2009 decision, the Sixth Circuit held that in spite of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. "other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, as well as pre-Code practice, clearly contemplate the
equitable power of bankruptcy courts to authorize creditors, in appropriate
instances, to bring claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate."14 The court
agreed with the decision in Cybergenics Corp., that "the ability to confer
derivative standing . . . is a straightforward application of bankruptcy
courts' equitable powers."' 5 "When the trustee is delinquent, the bank-
ruptcy court . .. should be able to exercise its equitable powers to authorize
a creditor to pursue recovery of fraudulently transferred property for the
benefit of the estate."'" Furthermore, the court held that by allowing cred-
itor derivative suits the "equitable remedy effectuates Congress's intent
that fraudulently transferred property be recovered for the bankruptcy
estate."' 7
Other circuits have considered whether creditor derivative is standing
available when the debtor in possession consents.' 8 In 2001, the Second
Circuit approached the questions of whether a creditors' committee may
gain standing with the consent of the trustee, debtor in possession, or
court-approved representative as a matter of first impression.' 9 The Sec-
ond Circuit adopted an approach similar to the one followed by the Ninth
Circuit in Spaulding Composites Co. and held that a creditors committee
may gain standing to pursue the debtor's claim if: "(1) the committee has
the consent of the debtor in possession or trustee, and (2) the court finds
that suit by the committee is (a) in the best interest of the bankruptcy es-
tate, and (b) is 'necessary and beneficial' to the fair and efficient resolution
of the bankruptcy proceedings."2 0 The approach adopted by the court,
known as the Commodore test, allows the debtor in possession and the
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. In re Trailer Source, Inc., 555 F.3d 231, 240 (6th Cir. 2009).
15. Id. at 242. (quoting Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 568).
16. Id. at 243.
17. Id.
18. See In re Smart World Techs., 423 F.3d. at 176 n.15 (stating "We have also recognized that
derivative standing may be appropriate where the debtor-in-possession consents.").
19. In re Commodore Int'l, Ltd., 262 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2001).
20. Id. at 100 (citing In re Spaulding Composites Co., 207 B.R. 899, 904 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997)).
The court in Spaulding Composites Co. held that a debtor in possession could stipulate to the represen-
tation by an unsecured creditors' committee "[s]o long as the bankruptcy court exercises its judicial
oversight and verifies that the litigation is indeed necessary and beneficial." Spaulding Composites Co.,
207 B.R. at 904.
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creditors' committee to divide the labor between them, while still allowing
the bankruptcy court the authority to manage the litigation and check for
possible abuses by the parties. 21 Therefore, the court held that a creditors'
committee may sue on behalf of the debtors, with the approval of the bank-
ruptcy court, "not only where the debtor in possession unreasonably fails to
bring suit on its claims, but also where the trustee or debtor in possession
consents." 22
On the other hand, some circuits have foreclosed on the idea of credi-
tor derivative standing in bankruptcy due to the fact that there is no ex-
plicit authority in the Bankruptcy Code to allow for such a practice. In
1999, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the
bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law by granting an individual creditor
standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer action on behalf of the bankruptcy
estate.2 3 After analyzing the provisions of the bankruptcy code the court
held that the "Code does not vest bankruptcy courts with the power to
grant standing to individual creditors to prosecute such actions." 24 Fur-
thermore, the court held that the bankruptcy courts cannot unilaterally
confer standing upon the creditor to pursue the claim itself and that "[i]f
such authority is to be granted it must come from Congress and not the
courts." 25 The Tenth Circuit has also considered the issue of creditor deriv-
ative standing and has held that "the Bankruptcy Code does not allow such
suits. "26
The Fourth Circuit refused to decide the issue of whether creditors'
committees could gain standing to sue in bankruptcy cases when faced with
the issue in 2005.27 The court noted that "[w]e have never decided whether
creditor derivative suits are permitted in the bankruptcy courts of this cir-
cuit" and that "[iut is far from self-evident that the Bankruptcy Code per-
mits creditor derivative standing."28 The court went on to note that it
would be "ill advised to decide this important and difficult issue here." 29 In
the end, the court held very narrowly stating that even assuming creditor
derivative standing was available it would not be permitted in this case
since the plaintiff failed to prove any prong of the Commodore test, includ-




23. Surf N Sun Apartments, Inc., v. Dempsey, 253 B.R. 490, 491 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 495.
26. In re Fox, 305 B.R. 912, 914 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004).
27. In re Balt. Emergency Servs. II Corp., 432 F. 3d 557 (4th Cir. 2005).
28. In re Balt. Emergency Servs. II, Corp., 432 F.3d 557, 560-61 (4th Cir. 2005).
29. Id. at 561.
30. Id. at 562.
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B. Bankruptcy Code and Pre-Code Based Arguments
Proponents of the doctrine of creditor derivative standing in bank-
ruptcy argue that the Code itself gives bankruptcy courts permission to ap-
prove such derivative suits, although that permission is implied. There is
no express provision in the Bankruptcy Code that confers derivative stand-
ing on creditors' committees. In fact, Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code
"confers standing to bring avoidance claims only on the trustee." 3 1 Other
provisions of the Code specify that the "debtor in possession my assert the
rights of the trustee in Chapter 11 cases where a trustee had not been ap-
pointed, [b]ut nowhere does the Code say that creditors may assert claims
derivatively on behalf of the trustee or the estate."32 However, while there
is no express provision in the Code granting derivative standing, there is
also no provision that "expressly forbids it either."3 3 Therefore, the courts
that allow derivative standing have found an implicit right in the Code to
bring such suits.
The Sixth Circuit looked to the language 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548 and
concluded that neither section precluded the "judicially created doctrine of
derivative standing" and that "the express statutory language does not pro-
hibit creditor standing, and that such standing furthers Congress's purposes
in balancing the interests between the debtor and its creditors in a Chapter
11 reorganization."34 The court noted that Section 547(b) provides that
"'[t]he trustee may avoid any [preferential] transfer . . . .," and that Section
548(a) provides that "[t]he trustee may avoid any [fraudulent] trans-
fer . . . ."' Therefore, the court must determine whether or not Congress
intended "to confer exclusive authority on the trustee or debtor-in-posses-
sion to bring avoidance actions."36 The court concluded that since a debtor
may use "Sections 547 and 548 as a sword to favor certain creditors over
others, rather than a tool ... for the benefit of all creditors" that Congress
did not intend to exclude creditors from seeking to avoid fraudulent trans-
fers when the debtor-in-possession abuses its discretion in not bringing
suit.37
Other courts have looked to the language of 11 U.S.C. § 1109 to argue
that the Code implicitly provides for creditor derivative suits. Section 1109
of the Bankruptcy Code provides "[a] party in interest, including . . . a
creditors' committee . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any
issue in a case under this chapter."3 Courts have held that this section
gives the creditor a qualified right to initiate suit with the bankruptcy




34. In re The Gibson Group, 66 F.3d at 1440.
35. Id. at 1440-41 (quoting 11 U.S.C. H§ 547(b), 548(a)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1978).
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court's approval.3 9 However, the Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. stated "we do not read § 1109(b)'s general provision of a right to
be heard as broadly allowing a creditor to pursue substantive remedies that
other Code provisions make available only to other specific parties."4 0
Therefore, courts that oppose creditor derivative standing hold that
§ 1109(b) does not entitle parties in interest to usurp the role of the debtor-
in-possession as the legal representative of the estate.41
Courts have also looked to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B) to provide a basis
for allowing creditor derivative standing. Section 503(b)(3)(B) of the
Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to recover administrative expenses in-
cluding "the actual, necessary expenses . . . incurred by . . . a creditor that
recovers, after the court's approval, for the benefit of the estate any prop-
erty transferred or concealed by the debtor." 42 The creditors' committee in
Cybergenics Corp., argued, and the majority of the court agreed, "that this
language would be superfluous if it were not possible for creditors to bring
derivative avoidance actions in bankruptcy." 4 3 The court in Cybergenics
Corp. focused on the word recover and held that "a creditor cannot directly
recover any property beyond that necessary to satisfy its own claim; it can-
not recover property for the benefit of the estate unless it sues deriva-
tively."4 4 Those courts that rely on 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B) conclude that
when the Code speaks of a creditor's right to recover it is referring to a
derivative suit.45
However, those who oppose creditor derivative standing argue that
Section 503(b)(3)(B) "could easily refer to a creditor who recovers prop-
erty for the benefit of the estate in a direct action rather than a derivative
action." 46 Furthermore, Professor Keith Sharfman in his article Derivative
Suits in Bankruptcy explains that the language "for the benefit of the es-
tate' does not have to mean 'on behalf of the estate." 47 He further argues
that the section is not superfluous (even if the court does not recognize
derivative standing) since without such a section a creditor who brings a
"direct, state law fraudulent transfer claim" would not be able to recover
the expenses incurred in prosecuting such a direct claim that benefits the
estate.48
39. See In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d. at 904 (stating "We agree with these bankruptcy courts that
... [§11109(b) imply a qualified right for creditors' committees to initiate suit with the approval of the
bankruptcy court.").
40. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. 530 U.S. at 8.
41. In re Smart World Techs., 423 F.3d at 182.
42. Sharfman, supra note 31, at 1-2 (internal quotations omitted).
43. Id. at 7 (citing Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 565).
44. Id. at 8 (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id.
47. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
48. Id.
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C. Bankruptcy Policies for and Against Creditor Derivative Standing
There is also disagreement among courts about whether or not grant-
ing a creditors' committee derivative standing enhances the policies behind
bankruptcy. Proponents of the doctrine argue that allowing creditor deriv-
ative standing promotes the bankruptcy policy of value maximization. For
instance, in Cybergenics Corp., the creditors' committee argued that since
their lawyers were working on a contingency basis and the estate would not
be liable for fees in excess of the recovery, the estate could only benefit
from the litigation and would not be harmed by it.4 9 After all, maximizing
the recovery of creditors would maximize the value of the estate as a
whole.
On the other hand, opponents of the doctrine argue that although
value maximization is a policy behind bankruptcy, one cannot look to pro-
mote one policy at the exclusion of all the other policy objectives and val-
ues reflected in the Bankruptcy Code and legislative history.50
Furthermore, creditor derivative suits may add value in some cases but
they could also reduce the value in others." Sharfman argues that al-
though no empirical studies have been done to determine the value max-
imization effect of creditor derivative suits, they could be analogized to the
shareholder derivative suits in the corporate context.5 2 In those cases,
"scholars have long doubted whether shareholder derivative suits, on bal-
ance, add value for shareholders" and in those cases where shareholders
succeed the amount is frequently only enough to benefit the shareholders
lawyers and not the shareholders themselves53
Sharfman also argues that creditor derivative suits are more likely to
subtract value than to add value given that "the prospect of creditors suing
derivatively would exacerbate the problems of firms and individuals in fi-
nancial distress by increasing transaction risks for potential lenders, assets
purchasers, suppliers, customers, . . . and employees, who might insist on
harsher terms or refrain from transacting altogether rather than risk future
derivative litigation with creditors." 4 The Supreme Court took this view in
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., when it noted that "'[t]he possibility of be-
ing targeted [by creditor-instituted litigation] ... could make secured credi-
tors less willing to provide postpetition financing.""' Furthermore, to the
extent that creditor derivative suits produce a reluctance of the part of
third parties to transact with the firm or individual in financial distress, the
aggregate debtor values and creditor recovery is reduced.56
49. Id. at 15.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Id.
53. Id at 16-17.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 13).
56. Id. at 18.
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Sharfman believes that creditor derivative standing is contrary to the
protection on nonbankruptcy entitlements, which is one of the central poli-
cies intended and reflected in the Bankruptcy Code." First of all "creditor
derivative standing enhances the rights of creditors by displacing the
nonbankruptcy norm that creditors may not bring lawsuits on a bankruptcy
estate's behalf."" Secondly, "creditor derivative standing narrows the
nonbankruptcy entitlements of a bankruptcy estate's potential defendants
by expanding the universe of those who may assert claims against them on
the estate's behalf."5 9
However proponents of the doctrine argue that creditor derivative
standing does not alter nonbankruptcy substantive entitlements.6 0 Daniel
Bussel argues that "[s]tanding is a procedural device for enforcing a sub-
stantive entitlement" and "[t]he substantive entitlement of the estate is not
altered by conferring standing on the creditors' committee."6 1 Bussel notes
that "[t]he elements of the causes of action, the available remedies, and the
defenses all remain the same" and that "no novel derivative action has
been created."6 2 In essence, the bankruptcy court has merely substituted
one estate fiduciary for another as the proper representative of the estate.
Opponents of the doctrine also note that creditor derivative standing is
contrary to the policy of administrative efficiency and judicial economy. A
foreseeable consequence of creditor derivative standing is that "bankruptcy
cases will become more complex and hence more difficult and costly to
administer." In Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., the Supreme Court took
note of this when it stated, "'the possibility of multiple . . . claimants' cre-
ated by '[a]llowing recovery to be sought at the behest of parties other than
the trustee could . . . impair the ability of the bankruptcy court to coordi-
nate the proceedings, as well as the ability of the trustee to manage the
estate.' "65
Another consequence of granting creditors' committees derivative
standing is that bankruptcy cases will take longer to wind up which in turn
will work to the detriment of creditors who will suffer from the delay.6 6
After all, one of Congress's stated goals in the Bankruptcy Code was to
provide a speedy resolution to the bankruptcy process, but allowing credi-
tor derivative suits is at odds with this policy since it would increase the
amount of litigation.67
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 19-20.
59. Id. at 20.
60. Daniel J., Brussel, Creditors' Committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy Litigation,
10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 28, 35 (2004).
61. Id. at 35-36.
62. Id. at 36.
63. Id.
64. Sharfman, supra note 31, at 20.
65. Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 12-13).
66. Id. at 21.
67. Id. at 22-23.
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Another policy behind Chapter 11 bankruptcy is rehabilitation of the
business debtor, but it is hard to see how creditor derivative standing pro-
motes that policy. 68 While creditor derivative litigation "might net a finan-
cial recovery for the bankruptcy estate," it is difficult to see how more cash
will improve its chances of rehabilitation since that depends on the firm's
long-term viability.6 9 The firm's long-term viability depends on its ability
to produce positive cash flows and recovery for a past wrong and "has little
if anything to do with the viability of the firm's operation going forward.""o
In fact, the costs of creditor derivative litigation are incurred at the outset
"when the firm's financial distress is like to be the most acute, while the
benefits (if any) are realized only later once there has been a judgment or
settlement."" Therefore, creditor derivative standing is likely to exacer-
bate short-term financial distress and thus undermine the goal of
rehabilitation. 72
III. ANALYSIS
Although the issue of creditor derivative standing has not yet reached
a consensus among the circuits, two cases in particular have created more
debate and added to the controversy. The next section discusses, in detail,
the Supreme Court's decision in Harford Underwriters Ins. Co., and the
Third Circuit's decision in Cybergenics Corp. While the Supreme Court
appeared to have definitively closed the debate by ruling that creditor de-
rivative standing was not available, a case decided by the Third Circuit af-
ter the Supreme Court's decision argued that the doctrine was still
available.
A. Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Third Circuit's Disloyalty to the
Supreme Court: A Detailed Look at the Intersection of Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. and Cybergenics Corp.
Some argue that a creditor cannot gain standing because the Supreme
Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., a Chapter 7 case that interpreted
the text of 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), held that such a provision excluded anyone
other than the trustee from seeking to recover administrative costs on its
own behalf, thereby preventing a bankruptcy court from authorizing a
creditor committee's suit.73 However, faced with the issue of whether a
creditors' committee can obtain permission from the bankruptcy court to
sue on behalf of the estate to avoid a fraudulent transfer in a Chapter 11
proceeding, the Third Circuit in Cybergenics Corp., authorized a creditors'
68. Id.




73. See Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 552.
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committee to bring suit derivatively.7 4 The Third Circuit stated that: "Sec-
tions 1109(b), 1103(c)(5), and 503(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code evince
Congress' approval of derivative avoidance actions by creditors' commit-
tees, and that bankruptcy courts' equitable powers enable them to author-
ize such suits as a remedy in cases where a debtor-in-possession
unreasonably refuses to pursue an avoidance claim."75 The holding is con-
sistent with the understanding that "'[n]early all courts considering the is-
sue have permitted creditors' committees to bring actions in the name of
the debtor in possession if the committee is able to establish' that a debtor
is neglecting his fiduciary duty." 76
The Third Circuit in Cybergenics Corp., was faced with the issue con-
cerning the bankruptcy court's equitable power to craft a remedy, including
authorizing a suit brought by a creditors' committee, when the Code does
not authorize such an action.77 The facts surrounding this case are as fol-
lows: Scott Chinery, who founded L&S Research Corporation in 1985 and
was its sole shareholder, marketed nutritional food supplements for weight
loss and body building under the brand name "Cybergenics."" In 1994,
Lincolnshire Management, Inc., (Lincolnshire) approached Chinery and in-
itiated negotiations to buy L&S, and the two reached an agreement for a
cumulative consideration of $110.5 million." Lincolnshire then established
Cybergenics Corporation, an equity investment affiliate, to obtain nearly
all of L&S's assets.so Cybergenics Corporation became the majority share-
holder in Cybergenics and provided the largest equity stake, although sev-
eral other lenders (the Lenders) helped to fund the asset acquisition."1 The
Lenders also agreed to provide working capital funds for Cybergenics after
the purchase.82 The buyout was memorialized in a writing dated October
13, 1994.83 Despite increased investments by Lincolnshire and the Lenders,
Cybergenics' financial position worsened.8 4 In August 1996, Cybergenics
filed for voluntary relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." At
which time Cybergenics remained in control of its' assets as debtor-in-pos-
session, therefore no trustee was appointed but a creditors' committee was
appointed to represent the interests of the unsecured creditors.8 6
Cybergenics soon realized that reorganization would not be possible and
decided to liquidate through a court-supervised auction."
74. Id. at 552-53.
75. Id. at 553.
76. Id. (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1103.05[6][a] (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th rev. ed.
1996)).
77. Id. at 552.









87. Id. at 553-54.
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The bankruptcy court approved the sale in October 1996 and
Cybergenics moved to dismiss the bankruptcy claim." However, the credi-
tors' committee objected on the grounds that certain transactions in the
buyout could lead to fraudulent transfer actions and that the debtor-in-
possession has a fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the estate.8 9 In
June of 1997, Cybergenics advised the court that it would not pursue any
fraudulent transfer claims because it believed that the cost of litigation
would outweigh any benefits. 90 At this time the committee volunteered to
bear all the costs, but Cybergenics still refused to bring an avoidance ac-
tion.9' The Committee then sought leave from the bankruptcy court to
bring a derivative action on behalf of the estate to avoid any fraudulent
transfers.92
After a hearing, the bankruptcy court decided that the avoidance
claims were colorable and that Cybergenics' refusal to prosecute them was
unreasonable.9 3 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court granted the Committee
permission to proceed derivatively.9 4 The defendants moved to dismiss the
suit claiming that § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states that only "the
trustee may" avoid fraudulent transfers and the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. of the same language in § 506(c)
gave the trustee exclusive standing that does not extend to creditors' com-
mittees. 95 The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and
concluded that the Supreme Court's interpretation of "the trustee may" in
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. applied to the same language in § 544(b).9 6
The creditors' committee appealed, but a panel of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that "§ 544(b) did not au-
thorize derivative standing for creditors' committees to sue to avoid alleg-
edly fraudulent transfers."9 7 In November, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals granted the committee's motion for a rehearing en banc vacating
the panel's decision upon finding that the bankruptcy court acted within its
power in granting the Committee derivative standing.9 8
B. Plain Language and the Supreme Court's Ruling in
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.
The district court's decision in Cybergenics Corp. relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's holding in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., so it is impor-
tant to examine the latter decision in length. In Hartford Underwriters Ins.







95. Id. (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.,530 U.S. at 1)).
96. Id. at 554.
97. Id. at 555 (citing Cybergenics Corp., 304 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2002)).
98. Id. at 555, 569.
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Co., the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether an administra-
tive claimant could seek recovery under § 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.99
In this case, Hen House International Inc. filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code becoming a debtor-in-possession.'"'
Therefore, Hen House retained possession of its assets and continued to
operate its business.1 01 During the reorganization the debtor continued to
receive workers compensation insurance from the petitioner, Hartford Un-
derwriters Ins., Co., although Hen House had repeatedly failed to pay the
insurance premium.102 Once it was clear that reorganization would not be
possible the court converted the action into a Chapter 7 liquidation pro-
ceeding and appointed a trustee.'0o Hartford heard this news and realized
the estate lacked enough unencumbered funds to satisfy the past due pre-
miums, and attempted to the charge the premiums to the respondent
bank.'0 4 Hartford filed an "Application for Allowance of Administrative
Expense, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503 and Charge Against Collateral, Pur-
suant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(c)." 05 The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of
Hartford and the District Court affirmed, but the Eight Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, en banc, concluding that § 506(c) could not be used by
an administrative claimant.' 06
Petitioners in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. argued that an effort to
recover unpaid premiums involved two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
namely §§ 503(b) and 506(c).0' Section 503(b) provides that "the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, sal-
aries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the
case" are treated as administrative expenses that are given priority over
unsecured claims.10 8 While the respondent did not dispute the fact that the
insurance premiums were an administrative expense within the meaning of
the statute, such expenses do not have priority over secured claims.' 09 Fur-
thermore, because the respondent held a security interest in essentially all
of the available assets, there were inadequate encumbered funds to pay the
administrative claims."o
Petitioners then relied on 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) which constitutes an im-
portant exception to the rule that administrative claims are inferior to se-
cured claims by providing that: "[t]he trustee may recover from property
securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and ex-
pense of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any
99. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. at 3.
100. Id.
101. Id.




106. Id. (citing In re Hen House Interstate, Inc., 177 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 1999)).
107. Id.
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benefit to the holder of such claims.""' The petitioner argued that this
provision gave them a right to bring a claim to recover the past due insur-
ance premiums as administrative expenses, since its furnishing of worker's
compensation payments benefitted the respondent by allowing the contin-
ued operation of Hen House, thus preserving the value of respondent's
collateral.1 12 Alternatively, the petitioner argued that "such benefit could
be presumed from the respondents consent to the postpetition financing
order.""13
The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the workers'
compensation met the requirements of a "'benefit to the holder"' under
§ 506(c), but instead assumed throughout this decision that it did.1 14 In-
stead, the Supreme Court focused on the issue of whether an administra-
tive claimant, like the petitioner, is a proper party to seek recovery under
§ 506(c)." 5 In making its decision, the Court opened with an overview of
statutory construction stating that Congress "says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there. "116 The Court also noted that, in
construing a provision of § 506, the function of the courts is to enforce the
provision according to its terms. 1 7 The statute's plain language specifies
that "[t]he trustee" may bring an action under § 506(c)."s Although the
statute is silent as to its accessibility by persons not trustees, the Supreme
Court held that the trustee was the only party entitled to invoke the
provision.119
In supporting its decision, the Court noted that many contextual fea-
tures supported the conclusion that exclusivity in the statute was in-
tended. 20 First, where a statute authorizes specific action and designates a
specific party entitled to take such action, "it is surely among the least ap-
propriate in which to presume nonexclusivity." 12 1 Second, the fact that the
trustee, who has an exceptional role in bankruptcy proceedings, is named
as the sole party in §506(c) makes it conceivable that Congress would grant
a power to him and not to others.122 Even if no party was named in
111. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1984)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. The respondent after the initiation of the Chapter 11 proceeding agreed to lend Hen
House an additional $300,000 to help finance the reorganization and the Bankruptcy Court entered a
financing order approving the loan and authorized Hen House to use such funds to pay expenses,
including workers' compensation expenses. Id. at 3-4.
114. Id. at 5 (quoting § 506(c)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. at 5-6.
116. Id. at 6. (quoting Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).





122. Id. at 7.
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§ 506(c), the trustee is the most obvious party empowered to this provi-
sion.12 3 Furthermore, if Congress intended the provision to merely estab-
lish that certain costs could be recovered from collateral, it could have
drafted it that way.12 4 Had Congress intended the provision to be widely
available, it could have inserted such language to make that intention
clear.125 The Court noted that Congress, in other sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, used broad language to describe the party who could act
under that section including terms like "a party in interest" in § 502(a) or
"an entity" in § 503(b)(4).126 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
broad language in other sections, contrasted with the phrase "the trustee"
in § 506(c), supports a conclusion that persons other than the trustee are
not entitled to use § 506(c).127
Petitioner further argued that "what matters is that § 506(c) does not
say that 'only' a trustee may enforce its provisions."12 8 Petitioner cited
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code that do use the word "only" or
other explicitly restrictive language in identifying the parties at issue and
argued that the absence of restrictive language meant that no party in inter-
est was excluded. 129 The Court stated that Petitioner's "theory-that the ex-
pression of one thing indicates the inclusion of others unless exclusion is
made explicit-is contrary to common sense and common usage."130 The
Court then went on to cite multiple provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that
do not contain the restrictive language but "cannot sensibly be read to ex-
tend to all parties in issue.""3
Petitioner then argued that § 1109 evidenced a right for a nontrustee
to recover under § 506(c) because § 1109 provides that "a party in inter-
est ... may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under
[Chapter 7]."132 However, the Court concluded that Chapter 11 provisions
were inapplicable in this case because the Petitioner attempted to use the
provision after the case was converted from Chapter 11 reorganization to a
Chapter 7 liquidation case.1 33 The Court refused to read "§ 1109(b)'s gen-
eral provision of a right to be heard as broadly allowing a creditor to pur-
sue substantive remedies that other Code provisions make available only to
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
126. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. §H 502(a), 503(b)(4)) (internal quotations omitted).
127. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(c)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
128. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id.
131. Id. The Court noted provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that do not expressly use the term
"only" but that still denote exclusive rights in the trustee, quoting 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), providing that
"[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease . . . property of the estate;" 11 U.S.C.
§ 364(a) providing that "the trustee" may incur debt on behalf of the bankruptcy estate; and 11 U.S.C.
§ 554(a) giving "the trustee" power to abandon property of the bankruptcy estate. Id.
132. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(c)).
133. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. 1 at 8.
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other specific parties.""3 The Court went on to note that "[iln general,
section 1109 does not bestow any right to usurp the trustee's role as repre-
sentative of the estate with respect to the initiation of certain types of liti-
gation that belong exclusively to the estate."1 3 5 The Court then held that
the "most natural" reading of § 506(c) evidences that the rights only ex-
tends to the trustee and the petitioner has an "exceptionally heavy" burden
to persuade the court that the section should be read to allow other parties
to use it.136
1. Pre-Code Practice and Hartford Underwriters Ins., Co.
Petitioner in Harford Underwriters Ins., Co. also argued that pre-Code
practices and policy consideration supported derivative standing for credi-
tors' committees.3 Petitioner argued that § 506(c)'s provision allowing
administrative expenses to be charged against lienholders continued a prac-
tice that existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.138 Although such a
policy was not within the text of the Act, its origin was traced back to early
cases that established an equitable principle providing that "where a court
has custody of property, costs of administering and preserving the property
are a dominant charge."139 Recognizing that it was the norm for the trus-
tee to seek recovery costs from the secured creditor, the Petitioner also
cited a number of lower court decisions in which parties other than the
trustee were allowed to pursue such charges under the Act, sometimes si-
multaneously with the trustee's pursuit of his own costs,140 but some-
timesl41 independently.' 4 2 Petitioner also relied on earlier decisions of the
United States Supreme Court allowing individual claimants to request re-
covery from secured assets.14 3
However, the Court stated that it was "questionable" whether such
precedents established a "bankruptcy practice sufficiently widespread and
well organized to justify the conclusion of implicit adoption by the
Code." 1" Further, The Court concluded that they had no confidence that
Congress was aware of such a rule when enacting the Code and that while
134. Id.
135. Id. at 7-8 (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1103.05[6][1] (Lawrence P. King, ed. 15th
rev. ed. 1996) (internal quotations omitted)).
136. Id. at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see, e.g., Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360, 376 (1908); Bronson v. La Crosse
& Milwaukee R.R Co., 1 Wall. 405, 410 (1863).
140. See, e.g., First Western Savings and Loan Ass'n. v Anderson, 252 F.2d. 544, 547-48 (9th Cir.
1958); In re Louisville Slugger Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897, 898 (W.D. Ky. 1936), affd, 93 F.2d 1008
(9th Cir. 1938).
141. See, e.g., In re Chapman Coal Co., 2 F.2d. 779, 780 (7th Cir. 1952); In re Rotary Tire &
Rubber Co., 2 F.2d. 364 (6th Cir. 1924).
142. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 9-10.
143. Id. at 10; see, e.g., Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U.S. 501, 506
(1891); Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U.S. 776, 779 (1884); New York Dock Co. v. Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, 121
(1927).
144. Id. (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
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"pre-Code practice 'informs our understanding of the language of the
Code,' it cannot overcome that language," but it is a tool on construction
and not an extra-textual supplement."145 Furthermore, "where the mean-
ing of the Bankruptcy Code's text is itself clear . . . its operation is unim-
peded by contrary . . . prior practice."1 46 The Court thought the language
of the Code, specifically § 506(c), left "no room for clarification by pre-
Code practices," and pre-Code practices cannot change § 506(c)'s language
of "the trustee" to "the trustee and other parties in interest."147
Lastly, the Petitioner argued that the reading of § 506(c) to allow
other parties in interest to bring suit was necessary for policy reasons, con-
tending that in some cases the trustee would lack the incentive to pursue
payment. 148 Without allowing parties other than the trustee to bring suit,
the Petitioner argued that secured creditors would enjoy services without
having to pay for them.149 Furthermore, the Petitioner argued that al-
lowing nontrustees to bring suit under § 506(c) may in fact further bank-
ruptcy's goals to the extent that a trustee may not use the section while
another individual creditor would."5 o Therefore, allowing such suits could
"encourage the provision of postpetition services to debtors on more
favorable terms."'"' While the Court agreed that such concerns were valid,
it did not agree that policy implications favored allowing nontrustee to pur-
sue claims under § 506(c).'52
Although some cases may lie dormant without nontrustee use, such
cases are limited by the trustee fiduciary duty obligations to seek recovery
under the section." 3 Furthermore, those that provide services to secured
creditors have other means to protect themselves: they may insist on cash
payment; they may be able to obtain superpriority under § 364(c)(1); they
can also avoid unnecessary losses by paying attention to the status of their
account. 154 The Petitioners argument may also lead to undesirable results
as a matter of public policy, increasing the number of parties that can seek
recovery under § 506(c) would create the likelihood of multiple administra-
tive claimants seeking recovery under that section.15 Each claim would
require an inquiry into "the necessity of the services at issue and the degree
of benefit to the secured creditor"; therefore, such suits could impair the
bankruptcy court's ability to organize proceedings, as well as the capability
of the trustee to administer the estate.'5 6 Lastly, secured creditors may be
less willing to provide postpetition funding for the fear that creditors might
145. Id. (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44 (1986)).
146. Id. (quoting BRP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994)).




151. Id. at 11-12.
152. Id. at 12.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1)).
155. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 12.
156. Id. at 13.
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use § 506(c) to recover funds, "even though their claim to have benefitted
the secured creditor was quite weak.""s' The Court then concluded that
the plain language of § 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code "does not provide
an administrative claimant an independent right to use the section to seek
payment of its claim," and that it is a task for Congress and not the courts
to achieve a better policy outcome.5 s
2. How Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. Affects Cybergenics Corp.
The court in Cybergenics Corp. agreed that Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co. is useful "for interpretive methodology," but the context in which that
decision arose was critical, because it is materially unlike the situation in
Cybergenics Corp.'5 9 While the same language, "the trustee may," is used
in §§ 506(c) and 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Third Circuit held that
§ 544(b) does not preclude the bankruptcy court from providing an equita-
ble remedy of authorizing a creditors' committee to sue derivatively when
the trustee unreasonably fails to do so.160 How then did the Third Circuit
circumvent the finding of exclusivity found in the language "the trustee
may?"
The Third Circuit distinguished Cybergenics Corp. from Hartford Un-
derwriters Ins. Co., noting that, in the latter case, Hartford did not seek the
trustee or the court's permission to proceed with its claims but rather did so
unilaterally.161 In contrast, the Committee in Cybergenics Corp. first peti-
tioned the debtor in possession to file an avoidance action, and only when
management refused (even after the Committee volunteered to bear the
costs), did the Committee seek action on its own.162 The court in
Cybergenics Corp. noted that this difference was of critical importance be-
cause the question in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. was whether a non-
trustee has the right to unilaterally circumvent the Code's remedial
scheme, but the issue in Cybergenics Corp. "concern[ed] a bankruptcy
court's equitable power to craft a remedy when the Code's envisioned
scheme breaks down."1 63 After making this critical distinction, how did the
Third Circuit determine that derivative suits survived Hartford Underwrit-
ers Ins. Co.? The Third Circuit reclassified the issue as the bankruptcy
court's equitable power to authorize creditor derivative standing, but the
substantive issue remains the same; whether or not a party other than the




159. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 558 (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 1).
160. Id. at 558.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 558-59.
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3. Surviving after Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.
The Third Circuit took great pains to distinguish Cybergenics Corp.
from Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., in order to allow the derivative suit
brought by the creditors' committee." Initially, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that an interpretation of the language in § 506(c) sup-
ported exclusivity since that code section "is effectively self contained." 16 5
In support of its determination, the Third Circuit looked to the Supreme
Court's interpretation in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., which noted that
there is no other provision in Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code that "even
arguably authorizes a party to 'recover [administrative expenses] from
property securing an allowed secured claim'"; therefore, there is no reason
to look beyond that section to understand its meaning. 16 6 Second, the
Court concluded that the trustee unique role in bankruptcy also evidenced
intent to give him powers not available to others.16 7
The court in Cybergenics Corp. noted that 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), unlike
§ 506(c), cannot be read in isolation, but it must be viewed as only a part of
the Chapter 11 framework.1 6 8 For instance, if one reads § 544(b) in isola-
tion, it would lead to immediate confusion because it seems to vest a cause
of action exclusively in a party, the trustee, that usually does not exist in a
Chapter 11 case.169 Therefore, in order to understand § 544(b), one must
also look to § 1107(a), which gives the debtor in possession the rights and
powers of a trustee in the case where no trustee is appointed.1 70 The Third
Circuit also noted that three other sections of the Bankruptcy Code must
be read in conjunction with § 544(b) to determine whether or not deriva-
tive standing is an acceptable equitable remedy in cases where the court
determines that the trustee or debtor in possession has unjustly declined to
bring an avoidance claim, specifically § 1109(b), § 1103(c)(5), and
§ 503(b)(3)(B). 1 7 1
C. Creditor Derivative Standing and Statutory Authorization
1. Section 1109(b)
Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states: "[A] party in interest,
including the debtor, the trustee, a creditor's committee . . . may raise and
may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter."172 The
Committee in Cybergenics Corp. contended that § 1109 does not provide
independent rights for creditors' committees to initiate suit; however, that
section does allow the bankruptcy court to permit and approve a creditors'
164. Id. at 559-60.
165. Id. at 560.
166. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(c)).
167. Id. at 560.
168. Id.
169. Id. The appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case is the exception rather than
the rule. In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226 (3d Cir. 1989).
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1109(b); 1103(c)(5); 503(b)(3)(B)).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).
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committee from bringing suit on behalf of the debtor in possession for the
benefit of the estate.17 3 There is precedent for such a view.1 74 While quot-
ing Collier, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "consistent with the
broad right of participation conferred by § 1109(b), the court may author-
ize a party in interest to commence litigation on behalf of the estate if cer-
tain conditions are satisfied.""' Although the Court in Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. held that § 1109 was inapplicable since that section is
only available in Chapter 11 proceedings and the debtor converted his case
to a Chapter 7 case, the Court stated in dictum that "'we do not read
§ 1109(b)'s general provision of a right to be heard as broadly allowing a
creditor to pursue substantive remedies that other Code provisions make
available only to other specific parties."'"1 7  The Committee responded that
§ 1109(b) must stand for something more than a right to interfere since '"a
general right to be heard would be an empty grant unless those who had
such right were allowed to act when those who should act did not."' 17 7 The
Committee then submitted that such dicta should not be given great weight
since the Court noted that it was inapplicable and that the Committee is
not asserting an independent right to bring a claim like the one asserted in
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.178
While the Third Circuit admitted that the Supreme Court's dictum is
not binding, such dictum is not viewed lightly.179 The court stated,
[W]e should not idly ignore considered statements that the
Supreme Court makes in dicta. The Supreme Court uses
dicta to help control and influence the many issues it cannot
decide because of its limited docket. "Appellate courts that
dismiss these expressions [in dicta] and strike off on their
own increase the disparity among tribunals (for other judges
are likely to follow the Supreme Court's marching orders)
and frustrate the evenhanded administration of justice by
giving litigants an outcome other than the one the Supreme
Court would be likely to reach were the case heard
there."180
Regardless of the dicta in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., the Third
Circuit did not conclude that the case presented in Cybergenics Corp. was
the type anticipated by the Supreme Court.'8 ' The Third Circuit concluded
that the Supreme Court was concerned that a party might use § 1109(b) to
173. Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 560-61.
174. Id. at 561.
175. Id. (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUFTCY, supra note 135, at 1 1109.05).
176. Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 8).
177. Id. (quoting Brief of Appellant at 26, Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d 548 (No. 01-3895)).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc., 205 F.3d 606, 612-13 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations omitted).
181. Id. at 562.
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assume the trustee's role as representative of the estate,182 but that no such
risk of usurpation existed in Cybergenics Corp. since the Committee did
not take any unsanctioned action."as Instead, the Committee sought per-
mission from the bankruptcy court to sue in the estate's name, which the
court granted "only after it determined that the debtor was neglecting its
statutory duty to act in the estate's interest."' 84 However, the Third Circuit
went on to conclude that § 1109(b) alone could not provide judicial power
to grant a creditors' committee the authority to bring a suit on its own since
that provision only addresses a committee's direct rights and not whether a
court has power to grant derivative standing.' 1
The Third Circuit found that although § 1109(b) did not address judi-
cial power to grant derivative standing that it is helpful in the fact that it
"evinces Congress's intent for creditors' committees to play a vibrant and
central role in Chapter 11 adversarial proceedings." 8 6 18In support of this
proposition, the Third Circuit looked to historical authority, including
§ 206 of the former Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 606, and former Chapter
X Rule 10-210(a), which it claimed were "designed to broaden creditor par-
ticipation in reorganization proceedings in order to remedy the deficiencies
of prior procedures."187 Most notably, however, is that § 1109(b) is
"broader than either of those provisions" since neither of them allowed a
creditor to raise an issue but rather allowed a creditor to merely be heard
on an issue.' 88 Therefore, the Third Circuit noted that since derivative
standing was available "in the pre-Code days of Section 206 and Chapter X
10-210(a), it would be odd to conclude that Congress abolished derivative
standing at the same time as it broadened committees' adversarial role
through § 1109(b)."18 9
After agreeing with the Committee, the Third Circuit held that
§ 1103(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifically states that "a com-
mittee appointed under section 1102 of this title may perform such other
services as are in the interest of those represented," also evinces Congress's
intent for creditors' committees to perform some functions on behalf of the
estate.' 90 The court recognized that a certain amount of flexibility was
written into the statute to allow the bankruptcy court to authorize the com-
mittee to bring suit when the usual representative is delinquent.191





187. Id.; see also In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985).
188. Id. at 562.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 563 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5)).
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2. Section 503(b)(3)(B) and the Role of Creditors' Committees
While §§ 1109(b) and 1103(c)(5) only provide indirect evidence of
Congress's intent and its envisioned role for creditors' committees,
§ 503(b)(3)(B) provides direct insight into the power of a bankruptcy court.
Section 503(b)(3)(B) "allows for the priority payment of the expenses of 'a
creditor that recovers, after the court's approval, for the benefit of the es-
tate any property transferred or concealed by the debtor."'192 Brunstad
argued that this provision monetarily rewards creditors' committees that,
with court authorization, pursue suits on behalf of debtors in possession
because it makes little sense to provide reimbursement to a "creditor that
recovers" if standing to recover is vested solely in the trustee - such an
interpretation would render § 503(b)(3)(B) unnecessary.' 93 However, Lin-
colnshire argued that such a provision only allows a creditor to recover
expenses from suits that the creditor may bring directly and that it does not
authorize derivative standing.1 94 Furthermore, Lincolnshire argued that
the text of the provision itself evidence that it only considers the rights of
creditors, not creditors' committees.' 95 Lincolnshire pointed out that Con-
gress knew the difference between the two parties as evidenced by
§ 1109(b) where Congress grants the right to appear and be heard to a
'party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee,
an equity security holders' committee, [or] a creditor."'19 6 Thus, Congress's
inclusion of the word "creditor" in § 503(b)(3)(B) and not the term "credi-
tors' committee" evidences Congressional intent for only creditors to re-
cover expenses.' 97
While the Third Circuit noted that there is a presumption "that Con-
gress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another," 198 it decided that the
"most natural reading of § 503(b)(3)(B) is that it recognizes and rewards
monetarily the practice of permitting creditors' committees, with court au-
thorization, to pursue derivative actions."199 In addition, the court con-
cluded that § 503(b)(3)(B) is not limited to direct causes of action since
"property recovered in a direct action is not recovered 'for the benefit of
the estate.' "200
In regards to Lincolnshire's argument that the omission of the term
"creditors' committee" from § 503(b)(3)(B) is dispositive of Congress's in-
tent that the provision can only be used by creditors, the Third Circuit
192. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. 503(b)(3)(B) (1982)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 564.
195. Id. (citing Br. of Appellees in Response to Br. of Amici Curiae at 16, Cybergenics Corp., 330
F.3d 548 (No. 01-3805)).
196. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)) (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994)).
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(3)(B)).
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noted, "we are realists, and we recognize that if we disallow the Commit-
tee's derivative suit but sanction derivative suits by individual creditors, the
individual creditors could simply substitute themselves as plaintiffs under
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 17(a) and move forward with litigation." 2 0 1 Moreover,
the court pointed out that the Code generally presumes that the singular
includes the plural, holding that it was satisfied that the purpose of
§ 503(b)(3)(B) is to allow the Committee to recover the expenses it in-
curred in the derivative suit.202 The court believed that any other interpre-
tation would render § 503(b)(3)(B) "superfluous, for absent judicial power
to authorize derivative suits by creditors, it makes no sense to speak of
rewarding a creditor who sues, with court permission, to recover property
for the benefit of the estate." 20 3
In the end, the Third Circuit concluded that the text of the Bankruptcy
Code, specifically reading §§ 1109(b) and 1103(c)(5) together, evidences
Congress's intent for committees to play a strong and flexible role in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and that the "most natural reading of the Code is that
Congress recognized and approved of derivative standing for creditors'
committees." 204 However, the court did note that an important "piece of
the puzzle is missing." 20 5 While the Code plainly demonstrates Congress's
approval of creditor derivative standing, none of the sections discussed di-
rectly authorize such standing.206 To fill in this piece, the Third Circuit
turned to the bankruptcy court's equitable powers to determine if such
powers enabled it to craft a remedy in situations where the provisions of
the Code seem to fall short of achieving their purpose.20 7
D. Equity and Bankruptcy Courts
"[C]ourts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their pro-
ceedings inherently proceedings in equity." 208 Although the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 increased the amount of regulation Congress
imposed on bankruptcy courts, it did not change the bankruptcy courts'
elementary nature.209 In fact, the Supreme Court after the enactment of
the Code, stated, "[tjhe bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity."2"0
Several other post-enactment Supreme Court decisions have dispelled any
lingering doubt, stating that bankruptcy courts will continue to be courts of
201. Id. at 565-66.
202. Id. at 566.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 567.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934) (citations omitted).
209. Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 567.
210. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 359 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315).
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equity.211 The bankruptcy court's equitable powers are also noted in the
Code itself:
[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of
an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude
the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or imple-
ment court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
process.212
Congress clearly intended for the estate to recover property that had
been "fraudulently transferred by the debtor" and created a mechanism to
achieve their intent.213 Congress vested the power and duty in the trustee
or the debtor-in-possession to avoid such fraudulent transfers and to seek
action if the estate would benefit.214 After all, "[a] paramount duty of a
trustee or debtor in possession in a bankruptcy case is to act on behalf of
the bankruptcy estate, that is, for the benefit of the creditors." 215 There-
fore, Congress undoubtedly intended for the trustee or debtor-in-posses-
sion to maximize the value of the estate and allow creditors to recover their
claims from the estate by avoiding fraudulent transfers.216
However, a problem arises when the trustee or debtor-in-possession
refuses to bring an action that would benefit the estate, thus violating its
fiduciary duties.217 In the opinion of the Third Circuit, this situation, in the
opinion of the Third Circuit, is exactly the type of circumstance where a
"bankruptcy court['s] equitable powers are most valuable" since it allows
courts to craft a remedy that is not directly authorized in the Code, but is
the type of "result the Code was designed to obtain."2 18 "'There is inher-
ent in the Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to . . . give effect to the policy of
the legislature.'" 219 The apparent policy concern in § 544(b) is "the need
to channel avoidance actions through the trustee, who acts as a gatekeeper
and prevents independent avoidance actions by creditors that might
prejudice the estate and rival creditors. "220
211. Id.; see also Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) ("[B]ankruptcy courts [ are
courts of equity and 'apply the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.'") (quoting Pepper v. Lit-
ton, 308 U.S. 295, 304(1939)); United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990)
("[B]ankruptcy courts as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor
relationships.").
212. Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 567 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000)).
213. Id. at 568.
214. Id.




219. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (quoting
Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. 195, 203 (1839)).
220. Id. at 568.
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While the text of § 544(b) allows a trustee as representative of the
estate to bring avoidance actions, "that provision does not foreclose a
bankruptcy court's equitable power to substitute itself as gatekeeper when
the trustee is delinquent, and to allow a creditors' committee to pursue an
avoidance action for the estate's direct benefit rather than its own." 2 2 1 The
Third Circuit noted "that the estate's recovery of fraudulently transferred
property" is the end result of the equitable remedy, which is exactly what
Congress envisioned and that 11 U.S.C. §§ 1109(b), 1103(c)(5), and
503(b)(3)(B) "anticipate the court's means of achieving that result." 22 2
Therefore, the Third Circuit in Cybergenics Corp. held that the bankruptcy
court acted within its power when it granted the Committee derivative
standing.22 3
E. Cybergenics Corp. Dissent
A panel of four judges disagreed with the majority in Cybergenics
Corp. The dissent concluded that the majority's interpretation of the lan-
guage "the trustee may" is "inconsistent with the plain and natural reading
of § 544(b), is not supported by the Code provisions it cites, is not ade-
quately grounded in prior practice and ... is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's plain meaning analysis" in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. of the
identical phrase in § 506(c).22 4 The dissent agreed with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. and held that Congress
means what it says in a statute.225 Furthermore, the dissent argued that
there is no ambiguity in the language of § 544(b) and that the provision
designates the trustee, and only the trustee, to bring suit.226 Therefore,
"[w]e should not presume [that we] have a free hand to broaden a right
which Congress has made exclusive. "227 Congress specifically authorized
creditors' committees to take particular action in other parts of the Code,
Congress would have drafted § 544(b) in a substantially similar way had it
intended for creditors' committees to be able to bring suit on behalf of the
estate under that provision.228 The dissent held that the plain meaning of
the text only allows a trustee to invoke the remedy under the statute.229
The dissent also discussed other Sections of the Bankruptcy Code that
the majority relied on to find that creditor derivative standing was author-
ized. The dissent looked to § 1109(b), and found that the provision only
allowed a creditors' committee to be heard by way of intervention but does
221. Id. at 568-69.
222. Id. at 569.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 580 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (citing Harford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. at 6).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 580-81 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 581.
229. Id. at 582.
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not allow a committee to initiate a suit.230 Some courts interpret this sec-
tion as a broad right to be heard.2 31 Such a broad right cannot be used to
"expand the intent evidenced by the plain, specific language used by Con-
gress in § 544(b)."232 Furthermore, any doubt as to the meaning of the
provisions was eliminated through the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hart-
ford Underwriters Ins. Co., when the Court stated, "'[iun any event, we do
not read § 1109(b)'s general provision of a right to be heard as broadly
allowing a creditor to pursue substantive remedies that other Code provi-
sions make available only to specific parties."'
233
The dissent also analyzed § 1103(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, focus-
ing on the fact that § 1103(c)(1)-(4) grant very specific powers to the credi-
tors' committee and none of which support the authority to initiate a
suit.234  Since Congress only granted "limited, discrete rights" in
§ 1103(c)(1)-(4) the court should not read § 1103(c)(5) as granting a
"broad, implied power to initiate suit." 2 3 5 Additionally, the dissent dis-
cussed § 503(b)(3)(B), deciding that this section only allows an individual
creditor to recover expenses to compensate the creditor when they "object
to discharge and then successfully locate and [bring] into the estate assets
[any asset] that had been transferred or concealed by the debtor."236
In regard to the majority's argument that the bankruptcy court's equi-
table power enables it to authorize creditors' committees to sue deriva-
tively, the dissent stated, "[t]he Code is the law here and equity cannot be
used to change the clear and plain language of a Code provision." 237 Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court possesses "whatever equitable powers bank-
ruptcy courts have, they 'must and can only be exercised within the
confines of the Bankruptcy Code.'"
238
In the end, the dissent concluded that the Bankruptcy Code does not
authorize courts to grant creditors' committees derivative standing and
"the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the federal courts have
any policy-making role in construing clear statutory language. "239 Further-
more, it is a task for Congress, and not the courts, to decide "if it is a good
idea for creditors' committees to have standing."24 0
F. Possible Substitutes for Creditor Derivative Standing
Granting creditors' committees derivative standing is not the only so-
lution to the problem arising when a debtor-in-possession from failing to
230. Id.
231. See Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1363 (5th Cir. 1986).
232. Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 582 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 8-9).
234. Id. at 583.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 583-84.
237. Id. at 585.
238. Id. (quoting Northwest Bank Worthington v. Albers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)).
239. Id. at 587.
240. Id. (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 13-14).
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bring suit on behalf of the estate. Both proponents and opponents of the
doctrine have discussed possible alternatives. Such alternatives include ap-
pointing a trustee, appointing an examiner, moving the court to order the
debtor-in-possession to sue, converting the bankruptcy case to a Chapter 7
case, or moving the bankruptcy court to authorize a committee to bring a
post-confirmation avoidance action.241
A creditors' committee can move to appoint a trustee pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 1104(a), which "allows for 'any party in interest' including a credi-
tors' committee to request appointment of a trustee 'for cause' or if the
appointment would be in the interest of creditors"' 242 "Cause to appoint a
trustee includes 'fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanage-
ment' of the debtor's affairs by current management, either before or after
commencement of the case." 243 "To the extent that they enable to remain
in place incompetent or untrustworthy debtors-in-possession who would
otherwise be replaced, creditor derivative suits undermine the Code's ob-
jective of appointing trustees when there is cause for doing so." 2 4 4 Further-
more, the appointment of a trustee would enable the trustee to pursue
claims while avoiding conflicts of interests that can influence debtors-in-
245
possession.
However, proponents of the derivative doctrine argue that "forcing
creditors['] committees to move to appoint trustees would amount to
'replac[ing] the scalpel of derivative suit with a chainsaw."' 246 Further-
more, appointing a trustee is an extraordinary remedy.247 Basically, a trus-
tee amounts to replacing the debtor's high-level management, which
increases costs in two ways.248 First, trustees are entitled to a substantial
statutory fee, and second, there is a cost "implicit in replacing current man-
agement with a team that is less familiar with the debtor specifically and its
market generally." 249 After all, a trustee is rarely appointed in Chapter 11
cases due to the belief that existing management is in the best position to
rescue the debtor. 2 50 The court in Cybergenics Corp. stated, "we believe
that appointing a trustee is too drastic a step to constitute a serious alterna-
tive to allowing derivative suits by creditors' committees." 251 Conse-
quently, since much of Chapter 11 is based on the idea of allowing current
management to retain control of the debtor, it is doubtful that Congress
241. See id. at 576-79.
242. Id. at 576 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982)).
243. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
244. Sharfman, supra note 31, at 25.
245. Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 576-77.
246. Id. at 577 (quoting Brief of Law Professor as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 13,
Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d 548 (No. 01-3805)).
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intended to replace that management when a debtor makes "a questiona-
ble decision not to prosecute a fraudulent avoidance claim. "252
Another possible alternative is to appoint an examiner who lacks the
authority to sue. Appointing an examiner is not as radical as appointing a
trustee since the examiner's duties are simply to investigate a debtor while
the debtor's management remains in place. 253 An examiner's duties are
listed in 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b), which states that the examiner has all "of the
duties of a trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to
perform."254 Courts have interpreted that this language means that an ex-
aminer may "initiate and pursue" claims on behalf of the debtor.255 None-
theless, concerns with appointing an examiner include the direct cost that
the estate will incur and also the possibility that § 1106(b) does not permit
examiners to pursue causes of action of behalf of the estate.256
Another alternative is moving the court to order the debtor-in -posses-
sion to sue, which could cause some problems.257 This option is not realis-
tic considering the fact that the management of a debtor-in-possession
often faces "severe conflicts of interest," including "a court order to file an
avoidance action would frequently amount to instructing management to
sue itself."2 58 This situation would cause the debtor- in-possession concern-
ing his duty to not vigorously prosecute a claim. 259 There is also the possi-
bility of converting the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case to Chapter 7
liquidation.260 This option is the most drastic since it essentially tells the
debtor-in-possession to "[p]ursue this action or we will dissolve your com-
pany."261 One last option focuses on a creditor's committees to bring a
post-confirmation avoidance action under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) which
gives the committee a variety of ways to protect its interest.262 This option,
like the other possibilities, is "far more disruptive to the reorganization
process than the simple step of allowing a creditors' committee to sue
derivatively." 2 63
IV. CONCLUSION
While courts have granted derivative standing to creditors' committees
after the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., it is
still unclear whether or not such a policy is authorized under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Courts that have authorized creditors' committees to bring
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1982)).
255. Id. at 577-78; see also In re Carnegie Int'l Corp., 51 B.R. 252, 256 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984).




260. Id. at 579.
261. Id.
262. Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d at 579.
263. Id.
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suit on behalf of the estate have chosen not to follow Supreme Court pre-
cedent. Those courts have interpreted the language of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)
to have a different meaning than the identical language in 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(c). While § 506(c)'s language of "the trustee may" has been inter-
preted to give trustees the exclusive right to recover property, the same
language in § 544(b) has been interpreted not to grant the trustee an exclu-
sive right. How can identical language be interpreted so inapposite? Had
Congress intended that creditors' committees be able to bring suit, it could
have written the Code to incorporate such a right. After all, there are
many other possibilities rather than jumping to the radical remedy of grant-
ing derivative standing to creditors' committees. While a debtor-in-posses-
sion may fail to fulfill his duties under the Code, Congress anticipated this
situation and drafted provisions to deal with such a problem. Congress has
allowed for a trustee or an examiner to be appointed in such cases, thus
relieving the necessity for derivative suits by creditors' committees. Deriv-
ative standing for creditors' committees may have been available in the
past, but, after the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co., it appears that the practice is not long sanctioned or available. How-
ever, despite clear precedent, some circuits continue to skillfully craft their
way around the Supreme Court's decision and continue to allow creditors'
committees to sue derivatively.
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